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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Fulton appeals from his Judgement of Conviction for sexual battery of minor child
sixteen or seventeen years of age. He asserts that his trial was so infected with error that his right
to due process of law was categorically rejected.
On appeal, Mr. Fulton asserts that he was denied his right to due process because of two
distinct fatal variances between the charging document and the jury instructions, one related to
the elements instruction and one related to the statutory instruction. Although neither of the
alleged variance was objected to, Mr. Fulton asserts that both variances are fatal and are
reviewable as fundamental error.
He also asserts that the jury instructions were rife with error, resulting in jury instructions
that were confusing and misleading to the jury, impermissibly lowered the State’s burden of
proof, and ultimately prejudiced the defense. Again, the error was not preserved for appellate
review. However, Mr. Fulton asserts that the erroneous jury instructions are reviewable as
fundamental error.
Additionally, Mr. Fulton asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct which
deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty to see that Mr. Fulton had a fair
trial by improperly arguing that conduct which did not amount to lewd and lascivious conduct
could be considered in determining whether the State had proven that Mr. Fulton had committed
actions amounting to lewd conduct, appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury, engaged
in vouching behavior, and disparaged defense counsel. Mr. Fulton contends that the misconduct
committed in his case was either preserved by objection or constituted fundamental error and that
the errors are not harmless.

1

Next, he asserts that the district court violated his right to due process of law by
incorrectly instructing the jury, in response to a jury question, that “[l]ascivious means wanton,
lewd, lustful, licentious, libidinous, salacious. Lewd means licentious, lecherous, dissolute,
sensual, debauched, impure, obscene, salacious, pornographic.” He asserts that instruction was
erroneous because it did not limit lewd and lascivious conduct to the manual-genital allegation.
Mr. Fulton did not object to the district court’s response to the jury question. However, he
asserts that error amounts to a fundamental error.
Furthermore, Mr. Fulton asserts that he was denied due process of law when the jury
returned a verdict of guilty for “Sexual Abuse of a Child Amounting to Lewd and Lascivious
Conduct,” a crime with which he had not been charged and, again, when the district court
entered a Judgment of Conviction for the crime of “Sexual Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or
Seventeen Years of Age, a violation of Idaho Code Section 18-1508A(1)(a),” a crime for which
he had not been convicted.
In addition, Mr. Fulton asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for a
mistrial. During the reading of the jury instructions, the district court read instructions four and
five, which each contained language from the sexual battery statute. Both instructions included
the statement, “[i]t is a felony for . . .” Defense counsel objected during the reading of the jury
instructions and the district court instructed the jury to mark out the word “felony” and replace it
with the word “crime.” The subsequent motion for mistrial was denied.
Finally, Mr. Fulton asserts that the errors are not harmless or, alternatively, that the errors
amount to cumulative error, depriving him of his right to a fair trial.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On October 23, 2015, an Information was filed charging Mr. Fulton with one count of
Sexual Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen Years of Age. (R., pp.44-45.) He entered
a plea of not guilty. (R., pp.48-49.)
The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.93-101.) The State presented the testimony of Jared
Crane, the Utah officer that interviewed the alleged victim; Natasha Robison, the defendant’s
wife; Samuel Tower, the Idaho detective that worked on the case, and D.B., the alleged victim.
(See Tr. Trial.) D.B. testified that Mr. Fulton had held her hand, kissed her, made her sit on his
lap, “rubbed [her] through her leggings,” kissed her again, unclipped her bra, touched her
breasts, and put his “hand down [her] pants and started rubbing.” (Tr. Trial, p.93, Ls.2-14, p.94,
Ls.1-25.)1 She clarified that he touched her genitals when his hand was inside of her pants.
(Tr. Trial, p.95, Ls.15-19.)
Defense counsel called Natasha Robison and the defendant, Mr. Fulton. (See Tr. Trial.)
Mr. Fulton testified that he kissed D.B., she sat on his lap while they were making out, he
unsnapped her bra, and touched her breasts. (Tr., Trial, p.136, Ls.24-25, p.139, Ls.10-20.) He
specifically denied putting his hand down D.B.’s pants, touching her crotch, touching her vagina,
touching her labia, or touching her genitals. (Tr. Trial, p.140, Ls.5-15, p.141, Ls.9-13.)
The jury was instructed that it could find Mr. Fulton guilty if it believed the statute
I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(a) had been violated or if Mr. Fulton had committed manual-genital contact
or “any other lewd or lascivious act.” (Jury Instructions No. 4 and 7; Tr. Addenda, p.63, L.12 –

1

For ease of reference, the transcript of the trial testimony will be cited as “Tr. Trial.” The
transcript of the additional portions of the trial and the sentencing hearing will be cited as
“Tr. Addenda.”
3

p.64, L.14, p.66, Ls.5-19.)2 During the reading of the jury instructions, defense counsel objected
because two of the instructions included the word “felony.” (Tr. Addenda, p.62, L.25 – p.64,
L.20.) The district court then told the jury to replace the word “felony” with the word “crime”
on their copy of the jury instructions. (Tr. Addenda, p.63, L.4 – p.65, L.1.)
During closing argument, the prosecution made several comments which Mr. Fulton
asserts amount to prosecutorial misconduct.
After the jury was sent to deliberate, defense counsel made a motion for mistrial based on
the district court’s use of the word felony in the jury instructions. (Tr. Trial, p.161, L.20 – p.164,
L.11.) The district court noted that defense counsel “brought up this issue early on in the jury
instruction conference” and was told that the motion should be reserved until the jury had been
sent out. (Tr. Trial, p.165, Ls.20-25.) The district court denied the motion and noted that the
problem had been fixed by informing the jury that it was a typo and to replace the word “felony”
with the word “crime” and that any prejudice was suffered by the State, not the defense.
(Tr. Trial, p.155, Ls.2-14.)
During jury deliberation, the jury sent a question asking “Can we get a definition of lewd
and lascivious act? In Instruction No. 10, we see definitions for erotic fondling and explicit
sexual conduct but no lewd and lascivious act.” (Tr. Trial, p.167, Ls.13-17.) The district court
provided the following answer: “Lascivious means wanton, lewd, lustful, licentious, libidinous,
salacious. Lewd means licentious, lecherous, dissolute, sensual, debauched, impure, obscene,
salacious, pornographic.” (Tr. Trial, p.167, L.18 – p.168, L.2.)
The jury found Mr. Fulton guilty of “Sexual Abuse of a Child Amounting to Lewd and

2

A Motion to Augment with a copy of the jury instructions has been filed contemporaneously
with this brief.
4

Lascivious Conduct.” (R., p.80 (emphasis added).)
The district court entered a Judgment of Conviction for the crime of “Sexual Battery of a
Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen Years of Age, a violation of Idaho Code Section 181508A(1)(a).” (R., pp.107-108 (emphasis added).) Mr. Fulton was sentenced to a unified
sentence of 15 years, with 7 years fixed, and the district court retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.107108.) He filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction.
(R., pp.124-126.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did a fatal variance exist between the charging document and the jury instructions
(elements instruction)?

II.

Did a fatal variance exist between the charging document and the jury instructions
(statutory instruction)?

III.

Did the jury instructions confuse or mislead the jury, lower the State’s burden of proof,
and prejudice Mr. Fulton?

IV.

Did the State violate Mr. Fulton’s right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct?

V.

Did the district court violate Mr. Fulton his right to due process of law when it incorrectly
defined lewd and lascivious conduct, in response to a jury question?

VI.

Was Mr. Fulton’s right to due process of law violated when the jury was allowed to
return a verdict for a crime with which he had not been charged and when the district
court entered a Judgment of Conviction for a crime with which he had not been
convicted?

VII.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Fulton’s motion for a mistrial?

VIII.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Fulton’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
A Fatal Variance Existed Between The Charging Document And The Jury Instructions:
Elements Instruction
A.

Introduction
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the elements of sexual battery of a minor child

sixteen or seventeen years of age committed by means of lewd or lascivious conduct – the jury
was instructed that the State must prove, “the defendant Israel Fulton committed an act of
manual-genital contact, or any other lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body of D.B.”3
(Jury Instruction No.7; Tr. Addenda, p.66, Ls.9-12 (emphasis added).) Because Mr. Fulton was
only charged with committing the sexual battery by means of manual-genital contact in the
Prosecuting Attorney’s Information (R., pp.44-45), the italicized language created a fatal
variance.

It also incorrectly defined lewd conduct, essentially allowing Mr. Futon to be

convicted of lewd conduct for an act that would not constitute actual lewd conduct.

B.

Standard Of Review
The existence of an impermissible variance is a question of law over which appellate

courts exercise free review. State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 479 (Ct. App. 2013).

If it is

established that a variance exists, the Court will then examine whether it rises to the level of
prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction. Id. However, trial error ordinarily will not
be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v. Adams,

3

Mr. Fulton raises two separate variance claims. In Issue I, he asserts there was a variance
between the elements instruction and the Prosecuting Attorney’s Information. In Issue II, he
asserts there was a variance between the statutory instruction and the Prosecuting Attorney’s
Information.
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147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). Mr. Fulton acknowledges that there was no objection made
to this jury instruction. Because this claim of error is raised for the first time on appeal, he must
establish that the error is reviewable as “fundamental error.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222
(2010).

Pursuant to Perry, in order to prove an error is fundamental a defendant must

demonstrate that: 1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2) there
was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional information not contained in the
appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning that there is
a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226.

C.

A Fatal Variance Existed Between The Charging Document And The Jury Instructions
Mr. Fulton was charged with Sexual Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen

Years of Age. (R., pp.44-45.) Specifically, the Prosecuting Attorney’s Information charged
Mr. Fulton with committing the sexual battery “by having Lewd and / or Lascivious contact with
and / or upon the body of a minor, D.B., a child sixteen or seventeen years of age, to-wit: sixteen
years old, by manual-genital contact.” (R., p.44.) However, when the jury was instructed, in the
elements instruction, that it could find Mr. Fulton guilty of sexual battery if “3. the defendant
Israel Fulton committed an act of manual-genital contact, or any other lewd or lascivious act
upon or with the body of D.B. . . .” (Jury Instruction No.7; Tr. Addenda, p.66, Ls.9-12 (emphasis
added).)
This instruction allowed Mr. Fulton to be found guilty for contact other than the manualgenital contact for which he was charged. The jury heard testimony about touching other than
manual-genital contact. D.B. testified that Mr. Fulton had held her hand, kissed her, made her sit
on his lap, “rubbed [her] through her leggings,” kissed her again, unclipped her bra, touched her
breasts, and put his “hand down [her] pants and started rubbing.” (Tr. Trial, p.93, Ls.2-14, p.94,

8

Ls.1-25.) Mr. Fulton testified that he had only kissed D.B., she sat on his lap while they were
making out, he unsnapped her bra, and touched her breasts. (Tr. Trial, p.136, Ls.24-25, p.139,
Ls.10-20.) Therefore, the jury may have found that Mr. Fulton’s actions in kissing D.B. and
touching her breasts may have constituted “any other lewd or lascivious act.”
Mr. Fulton asserts that the erroneous elements instruction created a fatal variance and
incorrectly defined lewd conduct. A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the
law applicable to the case before it.” Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho
299, 313 (2010). A variance may occur where there is a disparity between the allegations in the
charging instrument and the jury instructions. Day, 154 Idaho at 479; State v. Montoya, 140
Idaho 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2004). The instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the
charging document as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime
charged. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007). If they do not, there can be a fatal
variance between the jury instructions and the charging document. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327,
342 (2011). Additionally, the jury instruction must not permit the defendant to be convicted of
conduct that does not constitute the type of crime charged. Id.
Based upon the Prosecuting Attorney’s Information, manual-genital contact was the
conduct that had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order for Mr. Fulton to be found
guilty. It had to be clear to the jury that he could not be found guilty based upon some other
conduct, even if the jury believed such conduct could be described as lewd and lascivious. By
instructing that the jury could find Mr. Fulton guilty by means of manual-genital “or any lewd or
lascivious act . . . ,” the court was indicating that Mr. Fulton could be guilty based upon some
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other type of conduct if the jury believed it was lewd and lascivious. 4 However, the only type of
conduct for which Mr. Fulton could lawfully have been convicted was manual-genital contact,
even if the jury believed that Defendant engaged in other touching with the intent to gratify his
lust, passions, or sexual desires. As such, the elements jury instruction created a fatal variance.

D.

The Error Is Fundamental
Mr. Fulton meets all of the prong of the Perry test and the variance is reviewable as

fundamental error.
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Fulton’s right to due process. A fatal variance
is a due process violation. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937), State v. Chapa,
127 Idaho 786, 790 (Ct. App. 1995). Mr. Fulton has shown that the variance was fatal in section
C, above. Thus, the error implicates one of Mr. Fulton’s unwaived constitutional rights.
Further, the only other evidence of inappropriate conduct that the jury heard was the
allegations that Mr. Fulton had touched D.B.’s breasts, unhooked her bra, and kissed her. This
conduct does not amount to sexual battery by means of lewd conduct. The crime of sexual
battery by means of lewd conduct with a minor specifically includes several types of sexual
contact, including genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal
contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact. I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(a). In State v.
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed whether touching or

4

This danger is heightened by the later answer to a jury question. During jury deliberation, the
jury sent a question asking “Can we get a definition of lewd and lascivious act? In Jury
Instruction No. 10, we see definitions for erotic fondling and explicit sexual conduct but no lewd
and lascivious act.” (Tr. Trial, p.167, Ls.13-17.) The district court, provided the following
answer: “Lascivious means wanton, lewd, lustful, licentious, libidinous, salacious. Lewd means
licentious, lecherous, dissolute, sensual, debauched, impure, obscene, salacious, pornographic.”
(Tr. Trial, p.167, L.18 – p.168, L.2.) Mr. Fulton’s assertion that this instruction was erroneous
can be found in Issue V.
10

kissing the chest of a prepubescent girl constituted lewd conduct. The Court held that it did not
because the type of conduct included in the phrase “including but not limited to” must be the
conduct of a like or similar class or character to the types of conduct specifically listed. Id. at
486–87.
It was apparent from the jury instruction that the jury could convict Mr. Fulton based on
conduct other than manual-genital contact. This type of activity is not only different from that
with which Mr. Fulton was originally charged, but is not conduct that constitutes the type of
crime charged. The only type of conduct for which Mr. Fulton could lawfully have been
convicted was manual-genital contact, even if the jury believed that he engaged in other touching
with the intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desires. Touching the breast area or kissing
would not constitute the crime of sexual battery by means of lewd conduct. Thus, giving this
instruction violated Mr. Fulton’s right to due process.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record.

The law is clear that the

instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by
which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and that if they do not, there
can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document. Folk, 151 Idaho
at 342. The charging document and the jury instruction are in the record, so there is no need for
additional information outside the record. Further, there is no indication, in the record, that
Mr. Fulton knew more about the law than the trial court or the State nor any indication that he
was trying to sandbag the court. There is no evidence that the failure to object to the instruction
was a strategic decision, as Mr. Fulton gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the
jury an opportunity to convict him on uncharged conduct that does not meet the definition of
lewd conduct. Clearly, it would not be a reasonable strategic decision to allow Mr. Fulton to be
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convicted of conduct that does not constitute the crime charged simply for the sake of a potential
appellate reversal.
Third, there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. While the jury heard evidence of manual-genital contact, the jury also heard
evidence that Mr. Fulton had kissed D.B., touched her breasts, and unhooked her bra. Regarding
the manual-genital conduct, Mr. Fulton testified that while he did kiss D.B. and touch her breast,
he adamantly denied any touching of D.B.’s genitals. (Tr. Trial, p.136, Ls.24-25, p.139, Ls.1020, p.140, Ls.5-15, p.141, Ls.9-13.) The jury could have believed that Mr. Fulton did not have
manual-genital contact, but willfully kissed D.B. and touched her breasts.

Further, the

prosecutor, while discussing the elements of sexual battery by means of lewd conduct during
closing argument, specifically argued, “Now, that’s why this word [sic] “but not limited to.”
You can find the other acts that he committed, even without deciding the genital issue – that it
was lewd and lascivious: sitting on his lap, fondling her breast, taking her bra off, kissing her.”
(Tr. Addenda, p.77, Ls.20-25.) The jury was left with the impression that it could convict
Mr. Futon based upon touching other than manual-genital.
Because the giving of this instruction violated Mr. Fulton’s right to due process, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Fulton’s conviction
must be vacated.
II.
A Fatal Variance Existed Between The Charging Document And The Jury Instructions: Statutory
Instruction
A.

Introduction
The jury was incorrectly instructed on sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or

seventeen years of age committed by means of lewd or lascivious conduct when the district court
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read a section of the statute to the jury and instructed them that they should find Mr. Fulton
guilty if the statute had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This section of the statute
included the language “(a) Commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or
any part or any member thereof of such minor child including, but not limited to, genital-genital
contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact or
manual-genital contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or who shall
involve such minor child in any act of explicit sexual conduct.” (Jury Instruction No. 4; Tr.
Addenda, p.62, L.18 – p.64, L.14 (emphasis added).) Because Mr. Fulton was only charged with
committing the sexual battery by means of manual-genital contact in the Prosecuting Attorney’s
Information (R., pp.44-45), the italicized language created a fatal variance.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for variance issues was articulated in Section I(B) and is

incorporated herein by reference.

C.

A Fatal Variance Existed Between The Charging Document And The Jury Instructions
Mr. Fulton was charged with Sexual Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen

Years of Age. (R., pp.44-45.) Specifically, the Prosecuting Attorney’s Information charged
Mr. Fulton with committing the sexual battery “by having Lewd and / or Lascivious contact with
and / or upon the body of a minor, D.B., a child sixteen or seventeen years of age, to-wit: sixteen
years old, by manual-genital contact.” (R., p.44.) However, when the jury was instructed, the
district court read the following instructions to the jury:

INSTRUCTION NO. 4
There is a statute that is charged in this case that reads as follows:
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- - - crime for any person at least five (5) years of age or older
It is a felony
than a minor child who is sixteen (16) or (17) years of age, who, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of such
person, minor child, or third party, to:

(a) Commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or
any part or any member thereof of such minor child including, but not
limited to, genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital
contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact or manual-genital
contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or who
shall involve such minor child in any act of explicit sexual conduct.
If you find from the evidence that this statute has been proven by the State
beyond a reasonable doubt then you should find the defendant guilty.
If you find from the evidence that this statute has not been proven by the
State beyond a reasonable doubt then you should find the defendant not guilty.
(Jury Instruction No. 4; Tr. Addenda, p.62, L.18 – p.64, L.14 (emphasis added).) This
instruction must be read with Instruction 10, which defines some of the legal terms used in the
language of part (a):
INSTRUCTION NO. 10
As used in these jury instructions, the following words have the following
meaning:
...
(b) “Erotic fondling” means touching a person’s clothed or unclothed
genitals or pubic areas, developing or undeveloped genitals or pubic
area (if the person is a child), buttocks, breasts (if the person is a
female), or developing or undeveloped breast area (if the person is
a female child), for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual
gratification or stimulation of one or more of the persons involved.
“Erotic fondling” shall not be construed to include physical
contact, even if affectionate, which is not for the purpose of real or
simulated overt sexual gratification or stimulation of one or more
of the persons involved.
(c) “Explicit sexual conduct” means sexual intercourse, erotic fondling,
erotic nudity, masturbation, sadomasochism, sexual excitement, or
bestiality. . . .
(Jury Instruction No. 10, Tr. Addenda, p.68, L.8 – p.69, L.4.)
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These instructions allowed Mr. Fulton to be found guilty for contact other than the
manual-genital contact for which he was charged. The jury heard testimony about touching
other than manual-genital contact. D.B. testified that Mr. Fulton had held her hand, kissed her,
made her sit on his lap, “rubbed [her] through her leggings,” kissed her again, unclipped her bra,
touched her breasts, and put his “hand down [her] pants and started rubbing.” (Tr. Trial, p.93,
Ls.2-14, p.94, Ls.1-25.) Mr. Fulton testified that he had only kissed D.B., she sat on his lap
while they were making out, he unsnapped her bra, and he touched her breasts. (Tr. Trial, p.136,
Ls.24-25, p.139, Ls.10-20.) Therefore, the jury may have found that Mr. Fulton’s actions in
kissing D.B. and touching her breasts may have constituted “lewd or lascivious acts . . . but not
limited to,” or “explicit sexual conduct.”
Mr. Fulton concedes that several of the types of conduct described in instruction four
could not have been applied to the facts of his case. For example, there was no testimony
regarding genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact,
manual-anal contact, or, under the explicit sexual conduct section, sexual intercourse, erotic
nudity, sadomasochism, or bestiality. However, there was evidence presented at trial that
they jury could believe amounted to other lewd and lascivious acts and/or explicit sexual
conduct, specifically, erotic fondling by means of touching D.B.’s breasts.
As such, Mr. Fulton asserts that the erroneous statutory instruction created a fatal
variance. The instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to
the means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged. State v.
Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007). If they do not, there can be a fatal variance between the
jury instructions and the charging document.
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State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011).

Additionally, the jury instruction must not permit the defendant to be convicted of conduct that
does not constitute the type of crime charged. Id.
As noted in Issue I, based upon the Prosecuting Attorney’s Information, manual-genital
contact was the conduct that had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order for Mr. Fulton
to be guilty. It had to be clear to the jury that he could not be found guilty based upon some
other conduct, even if the jury believed such conduct could be described as lewd and lascivious
or explicit sexual conduct. By instructing that the jury could find Mr. Fulton guilty by any
means found in part (a) of the statute, the court was indicating that Mr. Fulton could be guilty
based upon some other type of conduct that the jury believed was lewd and lascivious5 or
amounted to explicit sexual conduct. However, the only type of conduct for which Mr. Fulton
could lawfully have been convicted was manual-genital contact, even if the jury believed that he
engaged in other touching with the intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desires. As such,
statutory jury instruction created a fatal variance.

D.

The Error Is Fundamental
Mr. Fulton meets all of the prong of the Perry test and the variance is reviewable as

fundamental error.
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Fulton’s right to due process. A fatal variance
is a due process violation. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937), State v. Chapa,
127 Idaho 786, 790 (Ct. App. 1995). Mr. Fulton has shown that the variance was fatal in section
C, above. Thus, the error implicates one of Mr. Fulton’s unwaived constitutional rights.

5

Additional arguments about how the jury instructions may have mislead the jury to believe that
conduct like kissing or touching the breast could amount to lewd conduct under the “but not
limited to” language can be found in Issue I and are incorporated herein by reference.
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Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record.

The law is clear that the

instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by
which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and that if they do not, there
can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document. Folk, 151 Idaho
at 342. The charging document and the jury instruction is in the record, so there is no need for
additional information outside the record. Further, there is no indication, in the record, that
Mr. Fulton knew more about the law than the trial court or the State nor any indication that he
was trying to sandbag the court. There is no evidence that the failure to object to the instruction
was a strategic decision, as Mr. Fulton gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the
jury an opportunity to convict him on uncharged conduct that does not meet the definition of
lewd conduct. Clearly, it would not be a reasonable strategic decision to allow Mr. Fulton to be
convicted of conduct that does not constitute the crime charged simply for the sake of a potential
appellate reversal.
Third, there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. While the jury heard evidence of manual-genital contact, the jury also heard
evidence that Mr. Fulton had kissed D.B., touched her breasts, and unhooked her bra. Regarding
the manual-genital conduct, Mr. Fulton testified that while he did kiss D.B. and touch her breast,
he adamantly denied any touching of D.B.’s genitals. (Tr. Trial, p.140, Ls.5-15, p.141, Ls.9-13.)
The jury could have believed that Mr. Fulton did not have manual-genital contact, but willfully
kissed D.B. and touched her breasts. Further, the prosecutor, while discussing the elements of
sexual battery by means of lewd conduct during closing argument, specifically argued, “Now,
that’s why this word [sic] “but not limited to.” You can find the other acts that he committed,
even without deciding the genital issue – that it was lewd and lascivious: sitting on his lap,
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fondling her breast, taking her bra off, kissing her.”

(Tr. Addenda, p.77, Ls.20-25.)

Additionally, “explicit sexual conduct” includes “erotic fondling.” The definition of “erotic
fondling” includes the touching of breasts. Therefore, the jury was left with the impression that
it could convict Mr. Futon based upon touching other than manual-genital.
Because the giving of this instruction violated Mr. Fulton’s right to due process, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Fulton’s conviction
must be vacated.
III.
The Jury Instructions Confused Or Mislead The Jury, Lowered The State’s Burden Of Proof,
And Prejudiced Mr. Fulton
A.

Introduction
The jury instructions in Mr. Fulton’s case were replete with errors. The district court

provided instructions that confused or mislead the jury and prejudiced Mr. Fulton by providing
instructions that varied from the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, incorrectly instructing on the
conduct for which Mr. Fulton could be convicted, providing unnecessary and prejudicial surplus
instructions, providing erroneous lesser included instructions, and providing an inaccurate
verdict form. Mr. Fulton did not object to these instructions. However, he asserts that these
instructions misstated the law, created fatal variances, and lowered the State’s burden, thus
violating his constitutional right to due process. Also, the errors are plain on the face of the
record, and there is a reasonable possibility that the errors affected the outcome of the trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury presents a question of law over

which this Court exercises free review.” State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 905 (2004). This Court
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may review un-objected to jury instructions under Idaho’s fundamental error rule. State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472-473 (2012); (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970 (2008)). Idaho
appellate courts generally will not consider an assertion of error on appeal unless the issue was
preserved in the trial court proceedings. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224 (2010). Pursuant to
Perry, in order to prove an error is fundamental a defendant must demonstrate that: 1) one or
more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2) there was a clear and obvious error
without the need for additional information not contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the
error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226.

C.

The Jury Instructions Confused Or Mislead The Jury And Prejudiced Mr. Fulton
When reviewing jury instructions, the appellate court looks to whether the instructions as

a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Parsons, 153
Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012). Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole because an ambiguity
in one instruction may be made clear by other instructions, and an instruction that appears
incomplete when viewed in isolation may fairly and accurately reflect the law when read
together with the remaining instructions. Id. “An erroneous instruction will not constitute
reversible error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.” State v.
Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 659 (2000); State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372 (2002). In addition,
the Idaho Supreme Court has held that errors in jury instructions are fundamental if the error
functions to “relieve[ ] the State of its duty to prove all elements of the charges beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011); see also Middleton v. McNeil,
541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (holding that “‘the State must prove every element of the offense, and
a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement.”). Mr. Fulton
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asserts that the district court’s jury instructions misstated the law, were apt to confuse the jury,
created a variance, and lowered the State’s burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In the case at hand, the district court provided the following instructions to the jury:
INSTRUCTION NO. 4
There is a statute that is charged in this case that reads as follows:
It is a felony crime for any person at least five (5) years of age or older than a minor child
who is sixteen (16) or (17) years of age, who, with the intent of arousing, appealing to or
gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of such person, minor child, or third party, to:
(a) Commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any part or any
member thereof of such minor child including, but not limited to, genital-genital
contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal
contact or manual-genital contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite
sex, or who shall involve such minor child in any act of explicit sexual conduct.
If you find from the evidence that this statute has been proven by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt then you should find the defendant guilty.
If you find from the evidence that this statute has not been proven by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt then you should find the defendant not guilty.
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
There is a statute that is charged in this case that reads as follows:
It is a felony crime for any person at least five (5) years of age or older than a minor child
who is sixteen (16) or (17) years of age, who, with the intent of arousing, appealing to or
gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of such person, minor child, or third party, to:
(a c) Cause or have sexual contact with such minor child, not amounting to lewd conduct
as defined in paragraph (a) of this subsection.
If you find from the evidence that this statute has been proven by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt then you should find the defendant guilty.
If you find from the evidence that this statute has not been proven by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt then you should find the defendant not guilty.
...
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Sexual Battery of a Child Amounting to Lewd
and Lascivious Conduct, the state must prove each of the following:
1. Between July 31 and August 2, 2015
2. in the State of Idaho
3. the defendant Israel Fulton committed an act of manual-genital contact, or any other
lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body of D.B.,
4. the defendant engaged in such conduct with the specific intent of arousing, appealing
to, or gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of the defendant, of such child, or
of some other person,
5. D.B. was 16 or 17 years of age, and
6. the defendant was at least 5 years of age or older than D.B.
If any of the above had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find the defendant guilty.
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Sexual Battery of a Child not Amounting to
Lewd and Lascivious Conduct, the state must prove each of the following:
1. Between July 31 and August 2, 2015
2. in the State of Idaho
3. the defendant Israel Fulton committed an act of manual-genital contact upon or with
the body of D.B.,
[or]
the defendant Israel Fulton involved D.B. in erotic fondling (defined by Jury
Instruction no. 13 10),
4. the defendant engaged in such conduct with the specific intent of arousing, appealing
to, or gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of the defendant, of such child, or
of some other person,
5. D.B. was 16 or 17 years of age, and
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6. the defendant was at least 5 years of age or older than D.B.
If any of the above had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find the defendant guilty.
...
INSTRUCTION NO. 10
As used in these jury instructions, the following words have the following
meaning:
(a) “Child” means a person who is less than eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) “Erotic fondling” means touching a person’s clothed or unclothed
genitals or pubic areas, developing or undeveloped genitals or pubic
area (if the person is a child), buttocks, breasts (if the person is a
female), or developing or undeveloped breast area (if the person is
a female child), for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual
gratification or stimulation of one or more of the persons involved.
“Erotic fondling” shall not be construed to include physical
contact, even if affectionate, which is not for the purpose of real or
simulated overt sexual gratification or stimulation of one or more
of the persons involved.
(c) “Explicit sexual conduct” means sexual intercourse, erotic fondling,
erotic nudity, masturbation, sadomasochism, sexual excitement, or
bestiality.
(d) “Sexual excitement” means the real or simulated condition of
human male or female genitals when in a state of real or simulated
overt sexual stimulation or arousal.
(Jury Instruction Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, 10; Tr. Addenda, p.62, L.18 – p.69, L.4.)
These instructions are erroneous. Specifically, instruction seven is erroneous because
it creates a fatal variance, as discussed in Issue I, and lowers the State’s burden by allowing
the jury to convict for sexual contact other than manual-genital.
Instructions four, five, and ten are unnecessary, contain highly confusing surplus
language, and do not follow the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions. These instructions contain
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the statutory language for I.C. § 18-508A sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen
years of age and some definitions of related terms from I.C. § 18-1507 sexual exploitation of
a child. While the Idaho Supreme Court has upheld jury instructions that do not strictly comply
with those contained in the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, has cautioned: “[w]e emphasize,
however, that any court which varies from jury instructions previously approved by this Court
does so at considerable risk that the verdict rendered will be overturned on appeal.” State v.
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647 (1998). Neither instruction four nor five follow the relevant pattern
instruction, ICJI 928.
Instruction four created a fatal variance by instructing on forms of lewd conduct for
which Mr. Fulton was not charged, presenting the “but not limited to” language, and
including instruction on “explicit sexual conduct,” as discussed in Issue II. Additionally, the
instruction lowered the State’s burden, by allowing the jury to convict Mr. Fulton for sexual
conduct which was less severe than manual-genital contact.

The instruction was also

unnecessary due to the inclusion of the later elements instruction. Finally, the instruction
informed the jury that they should find Mr. Fulton guilty, if they found that the statue had
been proven, but the instruction did not state which charge the jury should convict for, if they
found Mr. Fulton guilty based upon the language of instruction four.
Instruction ten is also unnecessary, because the phrase “or who shall involve such minor
child in any act of explicit sexual conduct,” found in instruction four, is not relevant to the actual
charge. As such, instruction ten merely provides definitions of terms that are not relevant to the
actual charge in the case at hand. The defined terms allow for the jury to find Mr. Fulton guilty,
by finding that he had committed acts of sexual conduct less severe than the charged manualgenital contact. As such, instruction ten contributed to the fatal variance, discussed in Issue II, is
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unnecessary because it did not define any terms related to the actual charge, and served only to
confuse the jury.
Instruction five, provided in relation to the lesser included offense, was also a superfluous
instruction. Although presumably unnecessary due to the later elements instruction on the lesser
included charge, it was actually not relevant because the later elements instruction included
incorrect statements of law, and did not instruct on “sexual contact” as noted in section (c) of the
statute. This instruction also erroneously informed the jury that they should find Mr. Fulton
guilty, if they found that the statue had been proven, but the instruction did not state which
charge the jury should convict for, if they found Mr. Fulton guilty based upon the language
of instruction five.
Instruction eight was an erroneous instruction. Although the instruction states that it
is for a crime with conduct “not
- - Amounting to Lewd and Lascivious Conduct,” it then lists
the specified contact as “manual-genital” or “erotic fondling.” (Jury Instruction No. 8,
Tr. Addenda, p.67, Ls.1-8.) Clearly, manual-genital contact is lewd and lascivious conduct.
Additionally, erotic fondling, by definition, is “explicit sexual contact.” (I.C. § 18-1508A;
I.C. § 18-1507.) As such, both types of asserted conduct fall under I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(a),
not I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(c). This instruction is an incorrect statement of law and is both
confusing and misleading. In effect, it left the jury unsure what conduct constituted which
offense and made it impossible to logically differentiate between the possible verdicts.
Instructions five and eight are also erroneous because “sexual contact” is not a lesser
included offense of the lewd contact, by means of manual-genital contact, charged. The relevant
portion of I.C. § 18-1508A states:
(1) It is a felony for any person at least five (5) years of age older than
a minor child who is sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, who, with the
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intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires
of such person, minor child, or third party, to:
(a) Commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or
any part or any member thereof of such minor child including, but not limited
to, genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal
contact, manual-anal contact or manual-genital contact, whether between
persons of the same or opposite sex, or who shall involve such minor child in
any act of explicit sexual conduct as defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code;
or
...
(c) Cause or have sexual contact with such minor child, not amounting
to lewd conduct as defined in paragraph (a) of this subsection . . .
I.C. § 18-1508A.
Section (c) specifies that the sexual contact must not amount to lewd conduct. As such,
section (c) cannot be a lesser included because the crime necessarily have different elements.
Comparing sections (a) and (b) of the sexual battery statute is similar to comparing I.C. § 181508 lewd conduct and I.C. § 18-1506 sexual abuse. As the Idaho Supreme Court noted,
sexual abuse of a child could not be a lesser included offense of lewd conduct under the statutory
theory because it is possible to commit lewd conduct without committing sexual abuse. State v.
Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529 (2011). “Each of these crimes requires proof of separate essential
elements not required of the other and the conviction of one will not bar conviction of the other.”
Id. (quoting State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 115 (1979)). The Flegel Court noted that an
important reason that sex abuse was not a lesser included was that by statutory definition,
the conduct establishing sex abuse was “sexual contact with such minor child, not amounting to
lewd conduct as defined in section 18–1508, Idaho Code.” Id.; I.C. § 18-1506. Therefore, it
was error to provide the “lesser offense” instructions as provided in instructions five and eight.
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In addition to the above erroneous instructions, the jury received an incorrect verdict
form. The form provided them with the option to find Mr. Fulton guilty or not guilty of three
crimes: “Sexual Abuse of a Child Amounting to Lewd and Lascivious Conduct,” “Sexual Abuse
of a Child not Amounting to Lewd and Lascivious Conduct,” and “Battery.” (R., pp.80-81.)
Mr. Fulton was charged with sexual battery, not sexual abuse. (R., pp.44-45.) Regardless, the
erroneously instructed jury found Mr. Fulton guilty of Sexual Abuse of a Child Amounting to
Lewd and Lascivious Conduct. (R., pp.80-81.) Arguments in support of the assertion that
Mr. Fulton was denied due process of law when the jury found him guilty of an offense for
which he was not charged can be found in Issue VI.
Finally, it appears that the jury did not have the benefit of all of the jury instructions
during deliberations.

It appears only post-proof instructions went into the jury room for

deliberations. The post-proof instructions were numbered 1-19 and the district court discussed
providing the packet of instructions, including only instructions 1-19, to the jury. (Tr. Addenda,
p.55, L.4 – p.59, L.23.) Although the district court read pre-proof instruction, the failure to
provide a copy to the jury may have caused further confusion or a misunderstanding of critical
information regarding burdens and the reasonable doubt standard. The pre-proof instructions, a
copy of which was presumably not provided to the jury for deliberations, included instructions
about the presumption of innocence, the State’s burden, reasonable doubt, punishment, and so
on. (Tr. Trial, p.24, L.2 – p.31, L.17.)

D.

The Errors Are Fundamental
Mr. Fulton meets all three of the prong of the Perry. First, the alleged error is a violation

of Mr. Fulton’s right to due process. A criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial is protected by the
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due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
U.S CONST. amd XIV; ID. CONST art. 1 § 13. The Idaho Court of Appeals has observed,
An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an element
of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process,
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011); State v.
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007); see also Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080–81, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 188–
89 (1993); or as a violation of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee.
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1835, 144 L.Ed.2d 35,
48–49 (1999); Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277–78, 113 S.Ct. at 2080–81, 124 L.Ed.2d
at 187–88.
Parsons, 153 Idaho at 669. A fatal variance is a due process violation. See De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937), State v. Chapa, 127 Idaho 786, 790 (Ct. App. 1995). Further,
instructions that mislead the jury or prejudice the complaining party are reversible error. Young,
138 Idaho at 372.
Mr. Fulton has shown that the instructions were incorrect, misleading, created a fatal
variance (see Issues I and II), and lowered the State’s burden in section C, above. Thus, the jury
instruction errors implicate one or more of Mr. Fulton’s unwaived constitutional rights.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. The jury instructions necessary
for review of this issue are in the record. Further, there is no indication in the record that
Mr. Fulton was trying to sandbag the court. There is no evidence that the failure to object to the
instructions was a strategic decision, as Mr. Fulton gained absolutely no strategic advantage by
allowing confusing and misleading instructions to the jury or by giving the jury an opportunity to
convict him on uncharged conduct that does not meet the definition of lewd conduct. Clearly, it
would not be a reasonable strategic decision to allow Mr. Fulton to be convicted of conduct that
does not constitute the crime charged simply for the sake of a potential appellate reversal.

27

Third, because Mr. Fulton did not object to the instructions during trial, he bears “the
burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error[s] affected the outcome of the
trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Mr. Fulton asserts that there is a reasonable possibility that the
instructional errors in this case affected the outcome of his trial. In addition to the reasons
Mr. Fulton argued in Sections I(C)(1) and II(C)(1) of his brief above, the errors in instructions
four, five, seven and eight in essence relieved the State of its burden of proving each element
beyond a reasonable doubt because the instructions allowed the jury to convict for conduct that
did not amount to manual-genital contact. Additionally, the instructions are confusing and
misleading, referencing statutes without instructing which offense the statute is related to and
referring the jurors to unnecessary definitions regarding irrelevant conduct. Taken as a whole,
the instructions are misleading, incorrect, and prejudicial.

As such, there is a reasonable

possibility that the errors contained in the jury instructions contributed to the jury’s finding.
Because the erroneous jury instructions violated Mr. Fulton’s right to due process, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Fulton’s conviction
must be vacated.
IV.
The State Violated Mr. Fulton’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct

A.

Introduction
Mr. Fulton asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which requires

the vacation of his conviction. During closing argument, the prosecution committed misconduct
which rises to the level of fundamental error because the misconduct was related to one or more
of Mr. Fulton’s constitutional rights and was so egregious that it may have contributed to the
jury’s verdicts. The unfairness created by the prosecutor’s misconduct resulted in Mr. Fulton
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being denied due process of law and was in violation of his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution. The violations occurred when the prosecutor improperly argued that conduct
that did not amount to lewd and lascivious conduct could be considered in determining whether
the State had proven Mr. Fulton had committed actions amounting to lewd conduct, appealed to
the passions and prejudices of the jury by asking that the jury send a message and keep the
community safe, engaged in vouching behavior by repeatedly stating that the prosecution
believed in the case, and disparaged defense counsel. Although defense counsel did not object to
these instances of misconduct, Mr. Fulton asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct amounted to
fundamental error, was not harmless and, as such, this Court should vacate his convictions.
Additionally, defense counsel objected when the State informed the jury that Mr. Fulton
was “grooming” the jury. This statement was clear misconduct and the State cannot prove that
the comment did not contribute to the conviction. As such, Mr. Fulton also asserts his conviction
should be vacated on this basis.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because Mr. Fulton’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional

principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006). Trial error ordinarily will not be addressed on appeal
unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861
(Ct. App. 2009). For alleged errors for which there was a timely objection, Mr. Fulton only has
the duty to prove that an error occurred, “at which point the State has the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 222 (2010). On appeal, Mr. Fulton also raises instances of un-objected to misconduct.
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Because these claims of error are raised for the first time on appeal, he must establish that the
errors are reviewable as “fundamental error.” Id. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that to obtain
relief on appeal for fundamental error:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant’s unwaived
constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;
and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the
outcome of the trial proceedings.
Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first show that
the alleged error “violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights,” and
that the error “plainly exists” in that the error was plain, clear, or obvious. Id. at 228. If the
alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry test, the error is reviewable. Id. To
obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must further persuade the reviewing court that the
error was not harmless, i.e., that there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the
outcome of the trial. Id. at 226-228.

C.

The State Violated Mr. Fulton’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial
Misconduct
“[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a requirement and a
safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due process.’” Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

Due process requires

criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978).
Prosecutorial misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005);
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Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the
prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The aim of due process is not the punishment of
society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.

1.

Misconduct For Which There Was No Objection

Closing argument “serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of
fact in a criminal case.” State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose “is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors
remember and interpret the evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450
(Ct. App. 1991)). “Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing
argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho
267, 280 (2003)). However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated
and those implied. Id.

a.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Diminishing Its Burden
And/Or Attempting To Modify The Legal Requirements For Lewd And
Lascivious Conduct

As noted in Issues I-III, there were numerous issues with the jury instructions in this case.
The instructional errors resulted in a variance and likely mislead the jury. These errors were
compounded by the prosecutor’s misconduct in asserting that jury could find Mr. Fulton guilty of
sexual battery by means of lewd and lascivious contact if they believed he had committed a lewd
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or lascivious act other than the charged manual-genital contact. Additionally, the prosecution
attempted to lower the State’s burden to prove acts amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct
when it erroneously suggested that Mr. Fulton’s admitted conduct, allowing D.B. to sit on his
lap, touching D.B.’s breasts, removing D.B.’s bra, and kissing D.B., amounted to “other lewd or
lascivious acts.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor made the following arguments:
Now, if you go to Instruction No. 4, along with Instruction 7 – Instruction 4 is the
actual wordage – wording from the statutes in the State of Idaho. So we, as
prosecutors, take those statutes, and we apply it to the facts of an individual case.
And I’ll have you kind of go through the statute, Instruction No. 4. And there’s a
very key word in that statute. It says: Commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts
upon or with the body or any part or any member thereof of such a minor child.
Then it says: Including – and here’s the key words – but not limited to . . . .
And it tells you all of the different ways that you could have a lewd and
lascivious act. The reason I point that out is the victim in this case, the young
lady, indicated that her vaginal area was touched, manual to genital. The
defendant denied that.
Now, I don’t find it unusual that the defendant would get on the stand and
deny that act. He has nothing to lose. She has nothing to gain by saying it
happened. Now, that’s why this word [sic] “but not limited to.” You can find
the other acts that he committed, even without deciding the genital issue –
that it was lewd and lascivious: sitting on his lap, fondling her breast, taking
her bra off, kissing her. This is a 34-year-old man with a 16-year-old girl.
Who’s the adult, and who’s the child?
So going to Instruction No. 7 . . . No. 3 says that Israel Fulton, the
defendant, committed an act of manual-genital contact. And then the big word
[sic] “or any other lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body of D.B.” . . .
So when you go through this – and you can check off 1 and 2, I think,
pretty easily. And I think you can check off No. 3 fairly easily. And you’ve got
the big word [sic], and I want you to circle it, “or any other lewd or lascivious
act upon or with the body of D.B.”
...
In jury trials we often give the jury a decision that they can do a lesser
included offense than the main offense. And I just told you the main offense that
we’ve charged. And we believe it, and we believe you should just stick to that.
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. . . If for some unknown reason to me, you don’t think that I proved, for the
benefit of the State of Idaho, beyond a reasonable doubt, the main charge, you can
go to this second charge.
And that’s Instruction No. 5. And it’s the same statute that was used in
Instruction No. 5. And it’s the same statute that was used in Instruction No. 4, but
there’s a subsection C. . . . And C says: Cause or have sexual contact with such
minor child, not amounting to lewd conduct as defined in paragraph A of this
subsection. And so if you find that his actions weren’t lewd, then you have the
opportunity to go to this lesser included subsection C, which corresponds with
Instruction No. 8.
(Tr. Addenda, p.76, L.25 - p.80, L.18 (emphasis added).)
It can’t possibly be just simple battery. It can’t possibly. There were sexual
events that occurred: touching of breast, making out, sitting on his lap, and
touching her genitals. These are sexual events that are lewd, that we don’t
accept in society.
(Tr. Addenda, p.97, Ls.8-13 (emphasis added).)
Misconduct may occur if the prosecutor diminishes or distorts the State’s burden to prove
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App.
2010). Further, a closing argument may not misrepresent the law. State v. Missamore, 114
Idaho 879, 882 (Ct. App. 1988); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86. Mr. Fulton contends that the
prosecution’s argument was tantamount to asking the jury to refuse to apply actual Idaho law and
find that Mr. Fulton’s admitted actions (kissing D.B. and touching her breasts) amounted to lewd
or lascivious conduct. The prosecution created a blatant error by arguing to the jury that it could
convict Mr. Fulton of sexual battery by means of lewd or lascivious conduct for lesser conduct
that could not legally amount to lewd conduct.
Since the Idaho legislature amended the lewd conduct statute in 1984, amending Idaho
Code § 18-6607 and redesignating it Idaho Code § 18-1508, lewd or lascivious conduct has been
acknowledged to include genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact,
oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact, or bestiality or sado-
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masochism. I.C. § 18-1508. Certainly, the statue also notes that this is not an exhaustive list by
noting lewd or lascivious conduct is “including but not limited to” the delineated conduct.
I.C. § 18-1508. However, in 2003, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed whether touching or
kissing the chest of a prepubescent girl constituted lewd conduct. State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho
482, 486-487 (2003). The Court held that it did not, because the type of conduct included in the
phrase “including but not limited to” must be the conduct of a like or similar class or character to
the types of conduct specifically listed. Id. Kissing, touching the breasts, removing a bra, and
lap sitting do not amount to a like or similar type of conduct and, as such, do not legally amount
to lewd or lascivious conduct.6
The State either knew, or should have known, the legal requirements for lewd or
lascivious conduct in Idaho. The State’s misrepresentation to the jury, that they could convict
Mr. Fulton of sexual battery by means of lewd conduct without deciding the genital contact issue
because he had committed other “lewd” acts, was blatant misconduct.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
We long ago held, “It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a
fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury.”
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903). They should not “exert their
skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error,
[because] generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused.” Id.
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007).
In this case, the prosecution’s assertions that kissing, touching the breasts, removing a
bra, and lap sitting amounted to lewd conduct was calculated to encourage the jury to reach a

6

During jury deliberation, the jury requested a definition of the terms lewd and lascivious. The
district court provided a dictionary definition of the terms. Mr. Fulton asserts that the district
court’s answer to the question was erroneous and mislead the jury. His arguments in support of
this assertion can be found in Issue V.
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guilty verdict based on an improper theory, rather than the facts of the case and their legal
application to the law. This argument violated Mr. Fulton’s rights to a fair trial and to due
process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

As such, this misconduct directly

implicates Mr. Fulton’s constitutional rights and is reviewable for fundamental error.

b.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Appealing To The Passions
And Prejudices Of The Jury

Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, ___, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903). The
prosecutor’s duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent
evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The
prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
During closing argument, the prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the
jury by stating:7
This isn’t a pleasant experience for anyone. And most of all I’m proud of the
little victim to come forward, to prevent this type of activity. And do we want to
send a message? Certainly we do. But most of all we want justice, and that’s up
to you.
It’s been a pleasure, as much as it can be, being before you. This is what I
do. But these are the kind of cases that make you solemn, make you don’t sleep
at night, that make you worry about your grandchildren, your children, and others.
This is a good community. We must keep it that way.
(Tr. Addenda, p.97, L.19 – p.98, L.5.)

7

Mr. Fulton asserts that there was one additional instance of prosecutorial misconduct by means
of appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury. That instance was objected to and is
discussed in section 2, of this issue.
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Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics,
are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1993); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho
891, 898 (1990); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844 (1982); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87 (Ct. App.
2007). The prosecutor’s statements resulted in an improper plea for the jury to decide this case
based on its fears, passions, and prejudices; namely, that if the jury did not send a message by
finding Mr. Fulton guilty, the community would no longer be safe.

In United States v.

Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that such pleas are wholly
improper:
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to
protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking. The
evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be convicted
for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence. Jurors may be
persuaded by such appeals to believe that, convicting a defendant, they will assist
in the solution of some pressing social problem. The amelioration of society’s
woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear.
Id. at 1149 (quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United
States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).

In Weatherspoon, where the

defendant was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, portions of the
prosecutor’s closing argument focused on the personal comfort and community safety which is
attendant to taking armed ex-cons off the streets. Id. at 1149. The Ninth Circuit held that, “[t]hat
entire line of argument . . . was improper.” Id. Then, after quoting the above language from
Koon and Monaghan, it observed that since Mr. Weatherspoon’s case turned solely on the
question of whether he had, in fact, been in possession of a firearm on the night in question, the
prosecutor’s arguments about the “potential social ramifications of the jury’s reaching a guilty
verdict,” were “irrelevant and improper“ because “[t]hey were clearly designed to encourage the
jury to enter a verdict on the basis of emotion rather than fact.” Id. at 1149-1150.
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Because the prosecutor’s statements, much like the prosecutor’s pleas in Weatherspoon,
were calculated to encourage the jury to reach a guilty verdict based on its emotion, rather than
the facts of the case, they were irrelevant and improper and their admission violated Mr. Fulton’s
rights to a fair trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally,
the misconduct also interfered with the jury’s ability to make an impartial decision, thereby
interfering with Mr. Fulton’s specific Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. As such, the
misconduct in this case clearly violates Mr. Fulton’s unwaived constitutional rights and deprived
Mr. Fulton of his right to a fair trial.

c.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Vouching For The Alleged
Victim

In closing argument, “both the prosecutor and defense counsel are entitled to discuss
fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom,”
and that this includes “the right to identify how, from the party’s perspective, the evidence
confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of particular witnesses.” State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho
160, 168 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). However, “it is improper for a prosecutor to express
a personal belief or opinion regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or as to
the guilt of the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). Closing argument should not include the
prosecutor's personal opinions and beliefs about the credibility of a witness. Phillips, 144 Idaho
at 86.
In the case at hand, the prosecution repeatedly told the jury that he personally believed in
the case and that the victim was honest. The prosecution’s statements went much further than
the permissible bounds and encouraged the jury to rely on the prosecutor’s beliefs:
Now, we sincerely believe, as the State of Idaho, that her genitals were touched
by his hand. . . .
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(Tr. Addenda, p.78, Ls.11-12.
In jury trials we often give the jury a decision that they can do a lesser
included offense than the main offense. And I just told you the main offense
that we’ve charged. And we believe it, and we believe you should stick to
that. . . . If for some unknown reason to me, you don’t think that I proved, for the
benefit of the State of Idaho, beyond a reasonable doubt, the main charge, you can
go to this second charge.
(Tr. Addenda, p.79, L.23 – p.80, L.8 (emphasis added).)
. . . If for some reason you believe his version of the facts, it’s possible that you
can move onto this lesser included charge. I don’t believe that, as the
representative of the State of Idaho, based on the evidence we presented. But
you have to go with what the evidence was, not with my beliefs, but with your
beliefs.
(Tr. Addenda, p.80, L.24 - p.81, L.6 (emphasis added).)
And [the alleged victim] was specifically asked by defense counsel, “What do you
have to gain about this?” And she answered honestly. . . .
(Tr. Addenda, p.86, Ls.12-14.)
They indicated that this was one of the best witnesses they ever saw.
Well, the truth will set you free. When you don’t have to get up and worry about
what you’re saying, you can say pretty much the truth without having to worry,
without having to prepare, without having to study.
(Tr. Addenda, p.95, L.23 – p.96, L.3.)
A prosecutor may commit misconduct by vouching during his closing arguments for the
credibility of the evidence he presented. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368 (Ct. App. 2010).
A prosecutor improperly vouches for evidence when he puts the prestige of the state behind that
evidence, expressing his personal opinions or beliefs about the quality of that evidence. Id.
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 provides, “A lawyer shall not ... in trial ... state a
personal opinion as to ... the credibility of a witness ... or the guilt or innocence of an accused.”
The rule applies to both the prosecuting attorney and to defense counsel. State v. Carson, 151
Idaho 713, 721 (2011). With respect to due process, the United States Supreme Court has
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explained why the prosecutor cannot vouch for a witness’s credibility or express a personal
opinion of the defendant’s guilt, stating:
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus
jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence.
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985).
In the case at hand, the State vouched for the credibility of D.B. and referred to the
prosecutor’s personal belief that Mr. Fulton was guilty of the sexual battery by means of lewd
conduct charge numerous times during closing arguments.
Mr. Fulton asserts that the comments by the prosecution crossed the line and amounted to
more than a fair comment on the evidence or inferences to be drawn there from. Instead, they
were attempts to bolster the credibility of D.B. and the State’s case in general. Regardless of the
State’s isolated comment that the jury needed to draw its conclusions based on its own beliefs,
the closing, when reviewed in its entirety, was designed to inform the jury of the conclusions that
they needed to reach because they were the conclusions of the prosecutor.
Prosecutorial vouching for the credibility of a witness either through bolstering or
undermining credibility is not merely an evidentiary issue as it is when a witness provides
vouching testimony. Instead, it is a distinct form of prosecutorial misconduct that implicates a
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constitutional right.8 It is a violation of Mr. Fulton’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial
to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the
law as explained in the jury instructions. In this case, misconduct related to the prosecution
expressing personal beliefs and bolstering the credibility of D.B. interfered with the jury’s ability
to make an impartial decision, thereby interfering with Mr. Fulton’s Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury. The misconduct in this case clearly violates his unwaived constitutional rights
and deprived him of his right to a fair trial.

As such, this misconduct is reviewable as

fundamental error.

d.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Disparaging Defense Counsel

Closing arguments should not contain disparaging comments about opposing counsel.
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000); State v.
Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 69 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 657 (Ct. App. 1984).
See also Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86 (finding that the prosecutor’s comments that the jury should be
“irritated” and “upset” with the defense constituted prosecutorial misconduct and warranted a
new trial).

8

Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, held that “unlike the
elicitation of an opinion from a lay witness in regard to credibility, vouching by a prosecutor
implicates a constitutional right.” State v. Anderson, Supreme Court Docket Number 39227,
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No.805 (December 30, 2013). Mr. Fulton
recognizes that this is an unpublished opinion and is not to be cited as authority because it is
neither case law nor binding precedent. See Internal Rule of the Idaho Supreme Court 15(f) (“If
an opinion is not published, it may not be cited as authority or precedent in any court.”).
Accordingly, Mr. Fulton is only citing to this case as an example of how the Idaho Court of
Appeals has dealt with this argument in the past. While this case is not binding authority, it is
limitedly persuasive on the issue of whether the type of misconduct prevalent in the case at hand
deals with a constitutional right, not merely an evidentiary issue.

40

During closing argument, the prosecution made disparaging comments about defense
counsel:
Now, one thing that I wanted to bring out – and it’s not abnormal for defense
counsel to try to taint a victim, to make them less than appealing to you, to try to
somehow indicate that they’re at fault or they’re wrong or they’re less than ideal.
(Tr. Addenda, p.82, Ls.7-12.)
He tries to impugn the defendant [sic], the defense does. I don’t like to take
personal shots at attorneys. The defense tries to impugn the victim, [D.B.] . . .
(Tr. Addenda, p.95, Ls.15-18.)
These comments were designed to not only disparage defense counsel, but also to
undermine the jury’s ability to make their own credibility determinations.

This argument

violated Mr. Fulton’s rights to a fair trial and to due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Additionally, the misconduct also interfered with the jury’s ability to make an
impartial decision, thereby interfering with Mr. Fulton’s specific Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury. Therefore, this misconduct is reviewable as fundamental error.

e.

The Alleged Instances Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Are Reviewable As
Fundamental Error

It is a violation of Mr. Fulton’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to have a jury
reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law as explained
in the jury instructions.

As such, prosecutorial misconduct, in general, directly violates a

constitutional right. It should be noted that the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Perry that,
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in
the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a
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fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This is an implicit recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court
that prosecutorial misconduct claims are linked to a constitutional provision.
In this case, the State’s argument that certain actions, which are legally not lewd conduct,
amounted to lewd and lascivious conduct, acted to both lower the State’s burden and modify the
legal requirements, a clear violation of Mr. Fulton’s right to due process of law. The misconduct
also interfered with the jury’s ability to make an impartial decision by clouding the issues
through pleas to the passions and prejudices of the jury, expressing personal beliefs about the
strength of the State’s case and the truth of D.B.’s testimony, and disparaging defense counsel,
thereby interfering with Mr. Fulton’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The State
violated Mr. Fulton’s right to a jury trial when the prosecutor attempted to encroach upon the
jury’s vital and exclusive function to weigh the evidence or lack of evidence presented. “The
right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment . . . includes the right to have the jury be
‘the sole judge of the weight of the testimony.’” State v. Elmore, 154 Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d
760 (WA 2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d 825, 838, 889 P.2d 929 (WA 1995)
(quoting State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250-51, 60 P. 403 (1900)).
The misconduct in this case not only involved Mr. Fulton’s state and federal
constitutional rights to due process, but also his federal and state constitutional rights to a jury
trial. As such, the error is reviewable for fundamental error. The error in this case plainly exists
from the record and no additional information is necessary. The record in this case suggests no
reason to conclude that defense counsel elected, as a matter of trial strategy, to waive any
objection when the prosecution committed numerous instance of misconduct. In fact, the record
shows that when counsel recognized misconduct he did object, as discussed in Section 2 of this
issue. Further, it cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury reach a
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verdict, not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible grounds presented
through misconduct.

f.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Requires Vacation Of The Conviction

Neither misconduct objected to nor misconduct constituting fundamental error, will
require vacating a conviction, unless the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471 (2007); see also State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571
(2007). In the case at hand, the prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the conviction
because it cannot be said that it did not affect the outcome of the trial.
The prosecution committed numerous instances of misconduct, each of which requires
that Mr. Fulton’s conviction be reversed. The prosecution informed the jury that they could
convict Mr. Fulton of sexual battery by means of lewd and lascivious conduct for conduct that
does not amount to lewd conduct, i.e. kissing, touching the breasts, unhooking a bra, and sitting
on a lap. This misconduct amounted to an egregious misrepresentation of the law. When
coupled with the issues in jury instruction (see Issues I-III and V), there is a strong probability
that the misconduct affected the outcome of the trial.
The prosecution unabashedly appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury. Asking
jurors to send a message and save their community from this type of conduct is especially
persuasive. The pressure to protect a community and their own children and grandchildren is too
heavy a burden for the average juror to disregard. As such, there is a great danger that the jury
considered protecting those they care about, rather than merely the evidence presented, in
rendering their verdict.
The prosecution bolstered the credibility of D.B. and the strength of its case through the
prosecutor’s expression of his personal beliefs.
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This misconduct encouraged the jury to

disregard their exclusive role as the judges of credibility in favor of the prosecutor’s beliefs.
This is a case that largely hinges on credibility. Mr. Fulton was convicted for having contact
with D.B. that amounted to lewd conduct. (R., p.80.) He admitted only to conduct that would
not amount to lewd conduct, specifically denying the he had manual-genital contact. (Tr. Trial,
p.136, Ls.24-25, p.139, Ls.10-20, p.140, Ls.5-15, p.141, Ls.9-13.) However, D.B. testified that
Mr. Fulton had touched her genitals. (Tr. Trial, p.93, Ls.2-14, p.94, Ls.1-25, p.95, Ls.15-19.)
There was no other evidence that the manual-genital conduct occurred. As such, determining
who to believe in this he-said, she-said case was the jury’s most vital decision. The prosecutor’s
repeated comments that he, a representative of the State of Idaho, believed in the case and the
victim likely affected the outcome of the trial.
Similarly, the prosecution’s disparaging of defense counsel likely had a similar effect,
due to its potential to undermine the jury’s ability to make clear credibility determinations.
Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct could have influenced the way the jury
considered the evidence, made credibility determinations, and rendered their verdict. This Court
should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Fulton of his right to a fair trial because it cannot say
beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not contribute to the verdict. In reviewing the
trial as a whole, the prosecutor’s improper comments, constituting misconduct, likely influenced
the jury. As such, this Court must vacate the conviction.

2.

Misconduct For Which There Was An Objection: The Prosecution Committed
Misconduct By Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury

During closing argument, defense counsel objected to the prosecution’s inappropriate
argument:
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And in this case the defendant takes the stand and says, “I did this and this and
this.” But what’s he trying to do to you? He’s trying to gain your confidence.
He’s grooming you.
MR. BARTHOLICK: Objection. I guess I’m going to object to that statement.
It’s overly prejudicial.
THE COURT: Overruled. It’s just argument.
(Tr. Addenda, p.85, L.17 – p.86, L.1.)
In addition to the earlier alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor also appealed
to the passions and prejudices of the jury when he referred to Mr. Fulton’s testimony as an
attempt to groom the jury.

The jury heard earlier testimony from Detective Tower about

grooming in the context of child sexual abuse. (Tr. Trial, p.72, L.1 – p.74, L.12.) As such, it is
clear the jury would have understood the prosecutor’s reference. Appeals to emotion, passion or
prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. Raudebaugh, 124
Idaho at 769; Smith, 117 Idaho at 898; LaMere, 103 Idaho at 844; State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho
163, 168 (1980); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87.
In this instance, the district court did not provide any curative instruction to the jury and,
therefore, the error was not remedied. Because this instance of prosecutorial misconduct was
objected to, the State has the burden of proving the error is harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222.
Mr. Fulton asserts the State will not be able to meet this burden.

3.

Even If The Above Errors Are Harmless, The Accumulation Of The Prosecutorial
Misconduct Amounts To Cumulative Error

Mr. Fulton asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct errors which occurred throughout his
closing were not individually harmless. However, assuming arguendo that this Court finds that
they were, the accumulation of the errors and irregularities that took place negated his right to a
fair trial and, thus, mandate reversal and a new trial. Mr. Fulton asserts that if this Court finds
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that more than one of the asserted, unpreserved, instances of prosecutorial misconduct is found to
be fundamental error, that these errors, along with the preserved error, can then be reviewed for
cumulative error for the purposes of determining if the prosecutor was engaging in a pattern of
misbehavior. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70-71 (2011). Recently, the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that when ruling on a motion for mistrial brought after an instance of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, the district court should not limit its view of the misconduct to the
specific isolated incident, but should also take into consideration whether or not the prosecutor is
engaging in a pattern of misbehavior. Id. “Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of
errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.
However, a necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one
error.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 230.
“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair;
our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”
Brady v. Maryland, 3 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346 (1973), the Idaho
Supreme Court, when reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, quoted the language of the
United States Supreme Court which found:
‘The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.’
Id. at 353-354 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added)).
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Mr. Fulton asserts that given the multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, it is
likely that even if each of the instances individually did not amount to reversible error, the
accumulation of the misconduct influenced the jury and deprived Mr. Fulton of a fair trial.

V.
The District Court Violated Mr. Fulton’s Right To Due Process Of Law By Incorrectly Defining
Lewd And Lascivious Conduct In Response To A Jury Question
A.

Introduction
Mr. Fulton asserts that the district court violated his right to due process of law by

incorrectly instructing the jury, in response to a jury question, that “[l]ascivious means wanton,
lewd, lustful, licentious, libidinous, salacious. Lewd means licentious, lecherous, dissolute,
sensual, debauched, impure, obscene, salacious, pornographic.” (Tr. Trial, p.167, L.18 – p.168,
L.2.) Because the statute defines the specific acts that constitute lewd conduct, and because
other sexual contact that does not amount to lewd conduct could be included under the district
court’s definition, the district court’s response was erroneous. The jury had heard testimony that
Mr. Fulton had kissed D.B. and touched her breasts and the prosecution had argued that the jury
could find Mr. Fulton guilty of sexual battery amounting to lewd conduct for these actions. The
law specifically disallows a conviction for sexual battery by lewd and lascivious conduct for this
type of contact and, as such, Mr. Fulton’s due process rights were violated. Mr. Fulton did not
object to the district court’s response to the jury question. However, he asserts that error
amounts to a fundamental error and requires vacation of his conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for not objected to instructional error was articulated in Section

III(B) and is incorporated herein by reference.
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C.

The District Court Denied Mr. Fulton’s Right To Due Process Of Law By Incorrectly
Defining Lewd And Lascivious Conduct In Response To A Jury Question
In State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals held, “[t]he

requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded
in the constitutional guarantee of Due Process.” Id. at 47 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 316 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); State v. McDougall, 113 Idaho 900, 902
(Ct. App. 1988)). “A jury instruction that lightens the prosecution’s burden of proof by omitting
an element of the crime, creating a conclusive presumption as to an element, or shifting to the
defendant the burden of persuasion on an essential element, is impermissible.” Id. (citing
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 (1975); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952);
State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 164 (1998); State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1982)).
During jury deliberation, the jury sent a question asking: “Can we get a definition of
lewd and lascivious act? In Instruction No. 10, we see definitions for erotic fondling and explicit
sexual conduct but no lewd and lascivious act.” (Tr. Trial, p.167, Ls.13-17.) The district court,
relying on State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50 (1952), determined that it would provide the jury with the
following answer: “Lascivious means wanton, lewd, lustful, licentious, libidinous, salacious.
Lewd means licentious, lecherous, dissolute, sensual, debauched, impure, obscene, salacious,
pornographic.” (Tr. Trial, p.167, L.18 – p.168, L.2.)
“A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case
before it.” Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 (2010). State v.
Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, 1154 (Ct. App. 1989), discusses the district court’s duties when
responding to jurors’ questions:
In general, it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether, and the
manner in which, to respond to a question posed by the jury during deliberations.
I.C.R. 30(b). See also Dawson v. Olson, 97 Idaho 274, 543 P.2d 499 (1975). This
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grant of discretion is premised on the assumption that the instructions as given are
clear, direct and proper statements of the law. Dawson v. Olson, supra.
Consequently, if a jury expresses doubt or confusion on a point of law correctly
and adequately covered in a given instruction, the trial court in its discretion may
explain the given instruction or further instruct the jury but it is under no duty to
do so. However, if a jury makes explicit its difficulties with a point of law
pertinent to the case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap in the
instructions, then the trial court has the duty to give such additional instructions
on the law as are reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury’s doubt or confusion.
Dawson v. Olson, supra. See also I.C. §§ 19–2132(a) and 19–2204 (trial court
must instruct the jurors on all matters of law necessary for their information).
Id. The instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the
means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged. State v. Hooper,
145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007). If they do not, there can be a fatal variance between the jury
instructions and the charging document. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011). Additionally,
the jury instructions must not permit the defendant to be convicted of conduct that does not
constitute the type of crime charged. Id.
In this case, Mr. Fulton was charged with sexual battery by having lewd conduct,
specifically by committing manual-genital contact upon D.B.

(R., pp.44-45.)

The jury’s

question demonstrates that they did not understand what acts could constitute lewd and
lascivious conduct. Instead of simply informing the jury that, in this case, lewd and lascivious
conduct could only be manual-genital contact, the district court provided an erroneous, extremely
out-of-date definition of the terms lewd and lascivious. The district court relied on a definition
of the terms lewd and lascivious from State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50 (1952). This case relied upon
the old Idaho Code § 18-6607, amended, to the current form Idaho Code § 18-1508, in 1984.
Prior to 1984, the statute provided:
Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious
act or acts upon or with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor or
child under the age of sixteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such minor or
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child, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a
term of not more than life.
Folk, 151 Idaho at 341 (quoting Ch. 1 § 1, 1973 Idaho Sess. Laws 1, 1.) At that time, the words
lewd and lascivious were thought to be words in common use and a dictionary definition was
thought to make the meaning clear. Evans, 73 Idaho at 56-57; State v. Herr, 97 Idaho 783, 787
(1976).
On July 20, 1983, a federal district judge issued his opinion in Schwartzmiller v.
Gardner, 567 F.Supp. 1371 (1983), in which he held unconstitutionally vague the wording of
Idaho Code § 18–6607, the former lewd conduct statute, because the terms lewd and lascivious
were vague and suggested that the statute be amended to identify the specific conduct prohibited.
Id. at 1376 -1379. The Idaho legislature took the judge’s suggestion and amended the statute.
From 1984 on, lewd conduct has specifically identified several types of sexual contact, including
genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal
contact, or manual-genital contact. I.C. § 18-1508. In State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003),
the Idaho Supreme Court addressed whether touching or kissing the chest of a prepubescent girl
constituted lewd conduct. The Court held that it did not because the type of conduct included in
the phrase “including but not limited to” must be the conduct of a like or similar class or
character to the types of conduct specifically listed. Id. at 486–87.
As such, the 1950’s dictionary definitions, provided by the district court, for the terms
“lewd” and “lascivious” were erroneous. Much like the federal district court found, in 1983, the
definitions provided by the district court were vague and provided the jury with an opportunity to
find that conduct other than the charged manual-genital could amount to lewd conduct for the
purposes of sexual battery.

This instruction provided for yet another fatal variance in

Mr. Fulton’s case.
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1.

The Error Was Fundamental

Mr. Fulton meets all three of the prongs of the test articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 226 (2010).
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Fulton’s right to due process. Mr. Fulton’s
arguments in support of this assertion can be found in Section C above and additional support is
located in Sections I(D), II(D), and III(D) and incorporated herein by reference.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. The district court’s response to
the jury question is in the record. Further, there is no indication in the record that Mr. Fulton was
trying to sandbag the court. There is no evidence that the failure to object to the instructions was
a strategic decision.

Mr. Fulton gained absolutely no strategic advantage by allowing a

responsive instruction that mislead the jury to believe they could convict him of sexual battery
by lewd conduct for any conduct that was “wanton, lewd, lustful, licentious, libidinous,
salacious, licentious, lecherous, dissolute, sensual, debauched, impure, obscene, salacious, or
pornographic,” instead of the charged manual-genital conduct.

Clearly, it would not be a

reasonable strategic decision to allow Mr. Fulton to be convicted of conduct that does not
constitute the crime charged simply for the sake of a potential appellate reversal.
Third, because Mr. Fulton did not object to the instructions during trial, he bears “the
burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error[s] affected the outcome of the
trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Mr. Fulton asserts that there is a reasonable possibility that the
instructional errors in this case affected the outcome of his trial.
As noted above, heard evidence that Mr. Fulton had kissed D.B., touched her breasts, and
unhooked her bra (Tr. Trial, p.136, Ls.24-25, p.139, Ls.10-20.) The jury had been instructed that
the State must prove, “the defendant Israel Fulton committed an act of manual-genital contact, or
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any other lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body of D.B.”9 (Jury Instruction No.7;
Tr. Addenda, p.66, Ls.9-12 (emphasis added).) Or, that the State must prove that Mr. Fulton had
violated a statute by “(a) Commit[ing] any lewd or lascivious act of acts upon or with the body or
any part or any member thereof of such minor child including, but not limited to, genital-genital
contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact or
manual-genital contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or who shall
involve such minor child in any act of explicit sexual conduct.”

(Jury Instruction No. 4;

Tr. Addenda, p.62, L.18 – p.64, L.14 (emphasis added).) Mr. Fulton has asserted that each of
these instructions created a fatal variance. See Issues I and II. Additionally, the prosecuting
attorney had told the jury that “You can find the other acts that he committed, even without
deciding the genital issue – that it was lewd and lascivious: sitting on his lap, fondling her
breast, taking her bra off, kissing her.” (Tr. Addenda, p.77, Ls.21-25.) Based on the testimony
presented, the erroneous instructions, and the prosecutorial misconduct, there was already a great
danger that the jury may have convicted on an improper theory. After all, if the jury believed
that manual-genital contact had occurred, there would be no need for their question; what
manual-genital contact required was actually clear from the instructions.
Mr. Fulton asserts that there is a reasonable probability that the jury reached its verdict on
an improper theory and that district court’s instruction in response to the jury question
contributed to the jury’s finding. Additional argument’s in support of this assertion can be found
in Sections I(D), II(D), and III(D), and are incorporated herein by reference.

9

Mr. Fulton raises two separate variance claims. In Issue I, he asserts there was a variance
between the elements instruction and the Prosecuting Attorney’s Information. In Issue II, he
asserts there was a variance between the statutory instruction and the Prosecuting Attorney’s
Information.
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Because the erroneous jury instruction violated Mr. Fulton’s right to due process, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Fulton’s conviction
must be vacated.
VI.
Mr. Fulton’s Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated When The Jury Was Allowed To
Return A Verdict For A Crime With Which He Had Not Been Charged And When The District
Court Entered A Judgment Of Conviction For A Crime With Which He Had Not Been
Convicted
A.

Introduction
Mr. Fulton asserts that he was denied due process of law when the jury returned a verdict

of guilty for “Sexual Abuse of a Child Amounting to Lewd and Lascivious Conduct,” a crime
with which he had not been charged and, again, when the district court entered a Judgment of
Conviction for the crime of “Sexual Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen Years of
Age, a violation of Idaho Code Section 18-1508A(1)(a),” a crime for which he had not been
convicted.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because Mr. Fulton’s claim is grounded in constitutional principles, it involves questions

of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2
(2006). Mr. Fulton did not object to the improper jury verdict or the improper conviction. As
such, he must establish that the errors are reviewable as “fundamental error.”

State v. Perry,

150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). Pursuant to Perry, in order to prove an error is fundamental a
defendant must demonstrate that: 1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were
violated; 2) there was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional information not
contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,
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meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 226.

C.

Mr. Fulton’s Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated When The Jury Was Allowed
To Return A Verdict For A Crime With Which He Had Not Been Charged And When
The District Court Entered A Judgment Of Conviction For A Crime With Which He Had
Not Been Convicted
“[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a requirement and a
safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due process.’” Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution states that, “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth
Amendment states, “[n]o state shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also
guarantees that, “[n]o person shall be…deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.” ID. CONST. art. I, §13. Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair.
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970).
In the case at hand, the Information specifically charged Mr. Fulton with Sexual Battery
as follows:
SEXUAL BATTERY OF A MINOR CHILD SIXTEEN OR SEVENTEEN
YEARS OF AGE
Idaho Code § 18-1508A(3)
(Life/$50,000 Fine; or both)
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Said defendant, between July 31 and August 2, 2015, at Rigby, Jefferson County,
Idaho, did commit sexual battery by having Lewd and/or Lascivious contact with
and/or upon the body of a minor, D.B., a child sixteen or seventeen years of age,
to-wit: sixteen years old, by manual-genital contact.
(R., p.44.) However, the jury returned a verdict form that found Mr. Fulton guilty of “Sexual
Abuse of a Child Amounting to Lewd and Lascivious Conduct.”10 (R., p.80.) The verdict was
read in open court and confirmed by the jury:
THE CLERK: State of Idaho, plaintiff, versus, Israel Fulton, defendant.
We, the jury, for our verdict, unanimously answer the question submitted to us as
follows: Question No. 1. Is Israel Fulton guilty or not guilty of sexual abuse of a
child, amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct? Guilty. . . . Dated the 30th day
of June 2016. Presiding officer, Karen Cawley.
THE COURT: So, ladies and gentleman of the jury, is this your verdict?
UNIDENTIFIED JURORS: Yes.
(Tr. Trial, p.170, L.12 – p.171, L.1 (emphasis added).) Following the sentencing hearing, the
district court entered a Judgment of Conviction for the crime of “Sexual Battery of a Minor Child
Sixteen or Seventeen Years of Age, a violation of Idaho Code Section 18-1508A(1)(a).”
(R., pp.107-108.) As such, Mr. Fulton was charged with sexual battery of a minor child sixteen
or seventeen years of age; convicted of sexual abuse of a child, amounting to lewd and lascivious
conduct; and sentenced for the original charge. It is undeniable that both being convicted of a
crime for which one has not been charged with and punished for a crime for which one has not
been found guilty is amounts to a serious due process violation.

10

Sexual abuse of a child amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct is not actually a cognizable
crime in the State of Idaho. I.C. § 18-1506 codifies sexual abuse of a child under the age of
sixteen years. However, it specifically notes that the sexual contact must not amount to lewd
conduct. I.C. § 18-1506(1)(b).
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D.

The Error Is Fundamental
Mr. Fulton meets all of the prong of the Perry test and the issue is reviewable as

fundamental error.

First, as discussed in section C, the alleged error is a violation of

Mr. Fulton’s right to due process. Thus, the error implicates one of Mr. Fulton’s unwaived
constitutional rights.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record.

The record contains the

Prosecuting Attorney’s Information charging the crime of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen
or seventeen years of age (R., pp.44-45), the verdict from showing a conviction for sexual abuse
of a child amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct (R., pp.80-81), and the Judgment of
Conviction for the crime of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age
(R., pp.107-108), so there is no need for additional information outside the record. Further, there
is no indication in the record that Mr. Fulton knew more about the law than the trial court or the
State nor any indication that he was trying to sandbag the court. There is no evidence that the
failure to object to the erroneous jury verdict or the erroneous Judgment of Conviction was a
strategic decision. Clearly, it would not be a reasonable strategic decision to allow Mr. Fulton to
be convicted of an offense for which he was not charged or to allow the district court to punish
him for an offense for which he had not been convicted simply for the sake of a potential
appellate reversal.
Third, there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected Mr. Fulton’s substantial
rights. While it may be argued that error was simply a typo in the verdict form, there is a
reasonable possibility that the jury verdict accurately reflects their unanimous decision. As was
discussed in Issue III, the jury instructions were misleading and replete with error. It is possible
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that the jury, confused by the jury instructions, determined that Mr. Fulton was guilty, not of
sexual battery by means of lewd conduct, but instead, sexual abuse.
Additionally, Mr. Fulton was sentenced to a unified sentence of 15 years, with 7 years
fixed, for a crime for which he has not been found guilty. (R., pp.107-108.) He began serving a
period of retained jurisdiction in October of 2016. (R., pp.107-108.) As such, he already has
suffered a deprivation of his liberty as a result of the due process violation
Because being convicted of a crime for which he was not charged and punished for a
crime for which he had not been found guilty violated Mr. Fulton’s right to due process, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Fulton’s conviction
must be vacated.
VII.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Fulton’s Motion For A Mistrial

A.

Introduction
During the reading of the jury instructions, the district court read instructions four and

five, which each contained language from the sexual battery statute for charge. Both instructions
included the statement, “It is a felony for . . . .” Defense counsel objected during the reading of
the jury instructions and the district court instructed the jury to mark out the word “felony” and
replace it with the word “crime.” Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Mr. Fulton assert that
the motion was erroneously denied.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho’s appellate courts effectively review denials of motions for mistrial de novo.

State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).
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[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.
Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse
of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is
one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.
Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003) (quoting State v. Shepherd, 124
Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983))).

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Fulton’s Motion For A Mistrial
A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that “[a] mistrial may

be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal
defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho
386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996). Mr. Fulton asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant a
mistrial.
During the reading of the jury instructions, the following events occurred:
No. 4: There is a statute that is charged in this case this case that reads as
follows: It is a felony for any person at least five years of age or older than a
minor child who is 16 or 17 years of age, who, with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of such person –
MR. BARTHOLICK: You Honor, I hate to interrupt. Can we sidebar just
very quickly?
THE COURT: Sure.
(Pause.)
THE COURT: There’s always something.
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Okay. So in Instruction No. 4 that you have in front of you, where it says,
in the second line, “It is a felony . . . .,” I’m crossing out “felony.” You all have a
pen. Cross out “felony” and write over the top “crime.” You got that? Okay.
Okay. So I am going to start over on No. 4. There is a statute . . .
No. 5: There is a statute that is charged in this case that reads as follows:
-MR. BARTHOLICK: Your Honor, I’m going to have – if we can sidebar
again. And I might need to sidebar with the court really quick if we can.
THE COURT: Okay.
(Pause.)
THE COURT:
Computers.

When you make a typo once, it seems to follow.

So in No. 5 where it says, “It is a felony . . . .,” you should cross out
“felony” and write “crime.”
...
(Tr. Addenda, p.62, L.18 – p.65, L.1.)
After the jury was sent to deliberate, defense counsel made a motion for mistrial based on
the district court’s use of the word felony in the jury instructions and the prejudicial effect
created as a result. (Tr. Trial, p.161, L.20 – p.164, L.11.) The State argued that the legislature
had written the statute and jury instruction, that the words “felony” or “misdemeanor” appear in
most trial instructions, and that there could be no harm or error to “give the exact language the
State of Idaho has endorsed.” (Tr. Trial, p.164, L.18 – p.165, L.19.) The district court noted that
defense counsel “brought up this issue early on in the jury instruction conference” and was told
that the motion should be reserved until the jury had been sent out. (Tr. Trial, p.165, Ls.20-25.)
The district court then ruled that:
I’ve also always felt that using the term “felony” is prejudicial to the State and not
the defendant because I think sometimes jurors are hesitant to convict someone of
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a felony when you use that word. And so – plus, I also feel that where we
explained to the jury that that was a typo and to use the word “crime,” that that
fixes any issue. I don’t think it prejudices the defendant. If it prejudices anybody,
it prejudices the State, and the State has not objected. And therefore I’m going to
deny the motion. But the motion I consider to be a timely motion.
(Tr. Trial, p.155, Ls.2-14.)
Mr. Fulton asserts that it was error for the district court to deny the motion for mistrial
because informing the jury that the crime he was charged with was a felony was overly
prejudicial, likely had a continuing impact on the jury, and deprived Mr. Fulton of his right to a
fair trial.
It is error to inform the jury whether a crime is a felony or a misdemeanor. The pattern
Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions are presumptively correct statements of law, and trial courts are
expected to use them unless another instruction would more adequately, accurately, or clearly
state the applicable law. State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 85 (Ct. App. 2011). As such, a proper
instruction for sexual battery would follow ICJI 928 Sexual Battery of a Child. The word felony
does not appear in ICJI 928. In fact, the pattern jury instructions for most crimes do not include
the words felony or misdemeanor. The only notable objection being instructions related to a
special verdict or enhancement, which require a bifurcated trial and those cases where having a
preexisting status as a felon creates the underlying offense, i.e. possession of a firearm by a
felon.

(ICJIs 1008, 1009, 1401, 1601.) (See also State v. Johnson, 86 Idaho 51 (1963)

(announcing that where a criminal defendant is charged under the persistent violator statute, the
information must be prepared in two parts, the first setting forth the substantive offense charged,
and the second alleging prior convictions and that the trial must also be bifurcated); State v.
Wiggins, 96 Idaho 766 (1975) (holding that the same procedure used in Johnson must be applied
to repeat offender DUI cases).) As such, the practical inference from the lack of the words
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“felony” and “misdemeanor” in the majority of Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions is that using
such words would be inappropriate.
Informing the jury that a crime is a felony or misdemeanor allows that jury to concern
themselves with punishment as it provides the jury insight into punishment. It is common
understanding that felonies are punished more severely than misdemeanors. When a jury is
instructed that they should not concern themselves with the subject of penalty or punishment, it
only follows that the jury should not be provided with information that might entice them to do
the opposite.
Furthermore, it is undoubtedly prejudicial to use the term felony. The term carries with it
a certain stigma that can only serve to further prejudice a defendant. It is common knowledge
that felons have to explain their criminal past on job applications and are not eligible to vote or
possess firearms. This common knowledge and related stigma are inherently prejudicial.
In the case at hand, the district court not only allowed the jury to erroneously hear the
term felony when instructing on the charges11, but repeatedly highlighted the term by asking the
jury to mark it out and replace it with the term “crime.” The jury was then allowed to take their
modified jury instructions with them into the jury room. The entirety of the curative instruction
given to remedy the error was, “When you make a typo once, it seems to follow. Computers.”
(Tr. Addenda, p.64, Ls.22-23.) The statement was made only after the second objection to the
term felony appearing in a second jury instruction. The district court’s off-hand comment did
little, if anything, to alleviate the prejudice of the term. Contrary to the district court’s assertion,
the statement did not “fix” the issue as it did not clarify that the term should not be considered,

11

Mr. Fulton maintains that jury instructions four and five were unnecessary and misleading.
His arguments in support of this assertion can be found in Issue III.
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that the jury should not speculate about whether a crime is a felony or a misdemeanor, or remind
the jury that they were not to concern themselves with punishment.
Including the word felony in the initial version of the jury instructions was erroneous and
highlighting the charge as a felony had an overwhelmingly prejudicial effect. There is a great
danger that the jury did not disregard the term, but that it considered it to Mr. Fulton’s detriment.
Mr. Fulton asserts that including the term felony only added fuel to the fire in a case that was rife
with error. As such, it was reversible error for the district court to deny the motion for mistrial.

VIII.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Fulton’s Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived
Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Fulton asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were harmless, the district
court’s errors combined amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine refers to an
accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated,
show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant’s constitutional right to due
process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). In order to find cumulative
error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and
then conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v.
Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under that doctrine, even when individual errors
are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair trial.
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994). However, a finding of cumulative error must be
predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 29 (Ct. App.
1996).
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Mr. Fulton asserts that the district court’s errors amounted to actual errors depriving him
of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are found in sections I–VII above, and
need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by reference.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Fulton respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this
case for a new trial.
DATED this 5th day of September, 2017.

___________/s/______________
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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